Karen Anderson Fahey v. Wilbur J. C. Fahey : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1955
Karen Anderson Fahey v. Wilbur J. C. Fahey : Brief
of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Skeen, Thurman, Worsley & Snow; Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Fahey v. Fahey, No. 8373 (Utah Supreme Court, 1955).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2384
ftECtfVED 
\;/ 
DEC g 195f• 
No. 8373 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
KAREN ANDERSON FAHEY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
WILBUR J. C. FAHEY, 
Defendant and A.p1J1ellam,t. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
LlW ; ~:~,..tY 
U. of U. 
SKEEN,THURMAN,WORSLEY 
&SNOW 
1501 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
A.UO'rneys for Plaintiff arn;d 
:Respondent 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF FA.CTS ............................................................ 4 
STATEMENT OF POINTS .......................................................... 9 
ARGUMENT ·······-·····································------------------------------········· 9 
POINT I. THERE WAS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT THE INTERLOCUTORY DE-
CREE AWARDED TO PLAINTIFF BY 
THE TRIAL COURT. ........................................ 9 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT 
ERROR IN REJECTING DEFENDANT'S 
EXHIBITS AND PROFFERS OF PROOF 
AND, IN ANY EVENT, DEFENDANT 
HAS FAILED TO SHOW HE WAS PRE-
JUDICED BY THE COURT'S RULINGS ..... 17 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 19 
CASES CITED 
Alldredge v. Alldredge (Utah) 229 P. 2d 681.. .............................. 15 
Hendricks v. Hendricks (Utah) 257 P. 2d 366 ........................ 10, 11 
Lawlor v. Lawlor (Utah) 240 P. 2d 271. ....................................... 16 
Schuster v. Schuster, 88 Utah 257, 53 P. 2d 428 ........................ 15 
STATUTES CITED 
Title 30-3-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ........... ·-----------··----------···-- 16 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
KAREN ANDERSON FAHEY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.- No. 8373 
WILBUR J. C. FAHEY, 
Defendant and Appellwnt. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Respondent is not satisfied with the statement of 
facts set forth in appellant's brief for the reason that 
it is incomplete, misleading and confusing. It pays little 
heed to the evidence establishing cruelty, on which ground 
the Trial Court awarded a decree of divorce to respond-
ent. Therefore, respondent will set forth her own factual 
statement. Appellant's references to the record appar-
ently refer to the typewritten numerals at the upper right 
hand corner of the transcript of testimony, but the re-
spondent, when referring to the record, will use the red 
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numerals placed at the bottom of each page of the record 
by the Clerk of the lower court. In this connedion, it is 
noted that the red-numbered pages 95 and 106 are dupli-
cates and that page 95 is not in proper sequence with the 
preceding and following pages. The parties will be desig-
nated as they appeared upon trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff and defendant were married in the Hawaii-
an Islands on October 9, 1948, immediately following the 
completion by plaintiff of a mission for the L.D.S. 
Church. Plaintiff met the defendant during the course 
of her mission work and the acquaintance grew to a 
closer relationship by means of exchange of letters. Be-
fore the marriage there was no courtship, in the ordinary 
sense of that word, between the plaintiff and defendant 
in view of the position occupied by the plaintiff in the 
mission field. This was plaintiff's first marriage. 
In the spring of 1949, the parties moved to Salt 
Lake City. Defendant's child by a former m·arriage, 
Susan, who was age 14 at the time of trial, made her home 
with the parties and it is apparent from the entire record 
that plaintiff then had, and has always had, a deep and 
abiding affection and love for this child. With the consent 
of the defendant, plaintiff adopted Susan as her child 
in the District Court of Salt Lake County several years 
prior to the institution of this divorce action. The only 
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issue of the marriage Is a son, Michael, born July 17, 
1954. 
Plaintiff's health has never been good, and in the 
years immediately preceding 1954 plaintiff suffered three 
miscarriages, was anemic and underwent surgery and 
other medical treatment in an effort to enable herself 
to carry a child and to correct the anemic condition. 
Plaintiff and defendant apparently never made the 
physical, mental and sexual adjustments necessary for 
a successful marriage. They apparently had not even 
held hands prior to the marriage, and following their 
first physical contact, plaintiff testified she was ''terri-
fied" (R. 43). Her fear of the defendant because of 
the physical and sexual treatment inflicted upon her 
gradually grew to hate (R. 43, 44), which emotion "slowly 
evolved" (R. 45). 
In this most tense and potentially dangerous situa-
tion, defendant revealed himself to be possessed of an 
explosive and ungovernable temper. He threw food and 
dishes out the back door (R. 44). He threw telephone 
books across the room and screamed at plaintiff (R. 44). 
Although he knew plaintiff was a devout member of the 
L.D.S. Church, he cursed the Temple and stormily criti-
cized the church and its authorities (R. 9, 10, 44). 
Such conduct was, unfortunately, not a rare occur-
rence. It happened "frequently" (R. 9). "Night after 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
night,'' the peace and quiet of the farnily dinner table was 
violated by defendant angrily shouting and yelling his 
criticism of plaintiff, her family, her friends and her 
church (R. 9, 10). He threatened plaintiff in obscene 
language (R. 11) and although he struck plaintiff physi-
cally only twice, he constantly threatened to strike her 
and apparently vented his spleen by spanking Susan on 
frequent occasions. 
According to his own admission, he slapped Susan a 
number of times (R. 88, 89). On the last such occasion, 
streaks were thus raised on the child's face (R. 68). He 
took her into the bathroom on this occasion and began to 
slap her. Her body was bumping against the wall. He 
was "hitting ... with the swing of his arm, from side to 
side, about the face and head of his daughter ... " (R. 68). 
He stopped only when threatened with the police. As the 
Trial Court no doubt observed, he is a large and power-
ful man. 
One of plaintiff's principal grounds of complaint 
concerned defendant's practice of forcing himself on her 
physically for sexual gratification at times when she was 
sick (R. 11), or after a family fight (R. 11 and 37), and 
also after she had had a reaction from an improper blood 
transfusion ( R. 11). 
Defendant is a member of the Air National Guard. 
His entire course of conduct, as revealed by this record, 
perhaps can best be pictured when it is noted that the 
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defendant described himself 1n these words: "I am a 
Master Sergeant, as you know, and I like to feel that the 
people listen to me ... " (R. 90). 
Plaintiff endured this tension-filled atmosphere sole-
ly because she wanted to make a home for herself and the 
child Susan (R. 47, 48), but when the defendant's con-
duct continued without change, even after the parties' 
own child was born, plaintiff determined that she could 
no longer live with the defendant. Her decision in this 
regard was hastened by the defendant's brutal slapping 
of the child Susan and his smashing her from wall to wall 
in the bathroom on August 11, 1954, as related by Mrs. 
Byron Anderson Lindsay, plaintiff's mother (R. 68). 
Defendant's violent temper is nowhere in the record 
better exemplified than by the incident in question. He 
stopped only when Mrs. Lindsay threatened to call the 
police. Contrary to appellant's assertion that the facts 
surrounding this incident are confused and the evidence 
conflicting, the facts are crystal clear and were admitted 
by the defendant on his direct examination. In the cross 
examination of 1[rs. Lindsay, counsel carefully refrained 
from attempting any attack upon Mrs. Lindsay's version 
of the incident. 
An examination of plaintiff's cross examination in-
dicates that her direct testimony concerning the principal 
grounds of cruelty was never shaken. Rather, counsel, 
upon his cross examination, attempted to establish that 
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plaintiff, prior to and shortly following the 1narnage, 
was emotionally unstable, apparently in the mistaken 
belief that if such a condition could be established it 
would constitute provocation for the defendant's unwar-
ranted acts of cruelty. 
Finally, appellant's brief is replete with insinuations 
and inuendo that the real cause of this divorce was de-
fendant's mother-in-law. Such a claim is without founda-
tion in the evidence, for the defendant, although invited 
by his counsel to testify to this effect, stated (R. 85) that 
after his mother-in-law moved to Salt Lake City he ''had 
a feeling our marriage was not quite as private as it had 
been and I felt that somehow there was more than on~ 
person had - I seemed to feel an influence." The last 
paragraph of defendant's testimony (R. 92) outlines the 
defendant's theory of the difficulty with the marriage, 
and it is interesting to note that although the defendant 
assigned a number of reasons for the marriage difficulty, 
at no time did he mention the influence of his mother-in-
law. 
upon this state of the record the Trial Court found 
that defendant had been guilty of cruel treatment, caus-
ing plaintiff great mental distress, and awarded plaintiff 
a decree of divorce. The disposition of property, as out-
lined by the Trial Court, was formulated in an effort 
to rnake certain plaintiff would have a place to live for 
herself and the children and recognized that she had 
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the greater need for the family automobile than did the 
defendant. No doubt much of the Trial Court's disposi-
tion of property was dictated by the fact that plaintiff 
had worked throughout the major portion of the marriage 
and must now continue to work. She has made substan-
tial financial contributions to the assets accumulated dur-
ing the marriage. She was awarded the furnishings in 
the family home, the use of the home, and the family 
car. She is still paying for the car. She was awarded 
$125.00 per month for support money for the children. 
Defendant earns approximately $450.00 per month and 
thus it is seen he retains more than 70% of his income 
for his own use. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. THERE WAS AMPLE .COMPE'TENT EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT THE INTERLOCUTORY DECREE AWARDED TO 
PLAINTIFF BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN 
REJECTING DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS AND PROFFERS 
OF PROOF AND, IN ANY EVENT, DEFENDANT HAS 
FAILED TO SHOW HE WAS PREJUDICED BY THE 
COURT'S RULINGS. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THERE WAS AMPLE ·COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT THE INTERLOCUTORY DECREE AWARDED TO 
PLAINTIFF BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
A thorough examination of the record in this case 
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can leave no doubt that there was an1ple com pC'tent evi-
dence to support the Trial Court's findings. Fr01n the be-
ginning of the marriage plaintiff was not in good physi-
cal health and obviously she was mentally distre~;~e<l b)· 
the cruelty of the defendant. Despite this fact, and de-
spite the fact that her condition was well known to her 
husband, the record reveals that at no time did he m:1ke 
any effort to change his conduct, but rather continued to 
allow free rein to a temper which rnounted in ferocity 
the rnore his will was thwarted. Courts do not and should 
not condone conduct such as is revealed by this record. 
Defendant cornplains that the Trial Court committed 
an act of judicial legislation in that this divorce, so he 
claims, was granted upon the ground of incompatability. 
It is suggested that the remarks of the Trial Court be 
read in context and in their entirety in order that the 
attitude of the Court n1ay be fairly appraised. 
The Trial Court never used the word '· incompata-
bility, '' but counsel constantly suggested that this was 
the ground of the Court's ruling. To this comn1ent, the 
Court simply said, ''The Supren1e Court just about de-
cided it in that case.'' The Court \\·as apparently refer-
ring to the case of Hendricks vs. Hendricks, :237 P. 2d 
366, decided in 1953. When counsel asked if the divorce 
in the present case was being gran ted on the grounds of 
incon1patability, the Court replied, ''I have not discussed 
this one yet.'' The Court was merely outlining what he 
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felt to be a comparable situation to the case at bar. 
Counsel then commenced his argument, claiming 
that there vvere no grounds for a divorce, but the Court 
said (R. 99), "He screams and shouts and indulges in sex 
relations without adequate preliminary preparation, 
that is sufficient for a divorce for a sensitive person.'' 
In commenting upon the defense raised by the de-
fendant to this action, the Court summed up its views of 
the en tire case in this language : 
''Most of the evidence you are offering is not 
showing he was driven to it. I think there are 
sufficient grounds if we cannot see the marriage 
as feasible to grant the remedy." (R. 103). 
Thus it appears that the Court felt that there had 
been eruelty on the part of the defendant, that all of the 
fault had not been on one side, that the marriage rela-
tionship was intolerable, and that if the court ordered 
them to go along as man and wife, they nevertheless 
would not reconcile (R. 103). This seems to respondent 
to bnng the case at bar squarely within the Hen,dricks 
case, and particularly within that portion of Mr. Justice 
Wade's opinion wherein he said: 
"From anything that appears in the instant 
case, no good purpose, either social, moral, ethical 
or legal could be served by refusing to grant a di-
vorce and settle the property rights of the parties. 
It would he but a mockery of the true concept of 
matrimony to thus purport to compel these two 
people, clearly ill suited and maladjusted to each 
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other to continue to retain the legal relationship 
of husband and wife.'' 
"Incompatability," as that term is customarily used, 
is not a ground for divorce in the State of Utah. The 
Trial Court did not grant this divorce on such a ground. 
Rather, the Court found that the defendant had treated 
the plaintiff cruelly, and that such conduct to a less sensi-
tive person might be overlooked, but that each case must 
be decided upon its own facts, having in mind the nature 
and characteristics of the parties involved. The Court 
merely stated what seems to respondent to be palpably 
clear: that what constitutes cruelty to one person may 
be of no moment or bother to another person. 
Defendant, being confronted with a record replete 
with evidence of cruelty, has entered, as expected, a de-
nial of such conduct, stating (R. 90) that the conduct as 
related by plaintiff was not his "normal way around the 
house.'' The Trial Court, as the trier of the fact, was 
in position to observe the witnesses upon the witness 
stand and to judge their credibility, and as is clear from 
the summary of the case given by the Court, he found 
plaintiff's specific allegations more believable than the 
perfunctory denial by the defendant. 
Counsel for defendant apparently recognizes the 
fundamental proposition that under these circumstances, 
it is his burden to convince the Supreme Court that the 
evidence is insufficient to support the findings of the 
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Trial Court and that prejudicial error has resulted. Coun-
sel thereupon, in his brief, undertakes to fulfill this for-
midable task by tacitly admitting that defendant was 
guilty of cruel conduct, but throws the blame upon the 
mother-in-law and upon plaintiff, who, he says, goaded 
the defendant into his cruelty. 
\Y e challenge counsel to cite any instance in the 
record from which a fact can be inferred that the mother-
in-law was in any way interfering with the marriage. 
Counsel did not seek to draw evidence of such interfer-
ence from his client, nor did he question plaintiff about 
this phase of the case. Further, he confined his examina-
tion of the mother-in-law to searching out the question 
of whether or not she had eavesdropped at a reconcilia-
tion meeting attended by the parties. Such unwarranted 
accusations of interference are not supported in any way 
by the record. In his decision, the Trial Court said: 
''We have not had any evidence here as to 
any particular like or dislike on the part of plain-
tiff's mother ... " 
The claim that l\lrs. Lindsay was furthering her designs 
and schemes, as alleged on page 21 of counsel's brief, not 
only is without basis anywhere in the evidence, but is an 
unseemly attempt to turn the attention of this Court 
from the true facts in the case in an effort to arouse pre-
judice in the eyes of the reviewing authority. 
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Likewise there is no evidence in the record to sup-
port the charge that plaintiff goaded the defendant into 
his cruelty. Defendant's counsel repeatedly insisted 
plaintiff was, and is, neurotic. The Trial Court apparent-
ly believed this to be so (R. 102). But, defendant has 
cited no authority for the proposition that a husband, 
whose wife is so afflicted, may treat his wife cruelly 
and then escape the consequences of his conduct upon the 
ground that the affliction provoked the cruelty. 
It is clear from plaintiff's testimony that she had 
endured much in the years prior to Michael's birth in 
1954. She apparently hoped that with the birth ·of their 
child things would be better for the family. It was only 
when defendant stood over the crib of the child and 
screamed and shouted at plaintiff that she realized that 
her efforts had been futile and that the marriage was im-
possible. Even so, she was not provoked into instituting 
an action in the courts until she learned of the defend-
ant's unwarranted beating of the child Susan as related 
by Mrs. Lindsay. It is reasonable to infer from the evi-
dence that she examined the welts on the child's face and 
heard the child's story, and that she thereupon deter-
mined to obtain a divorce. Defendant's attitude through-
out this marriage is thoroughly exemplified when he 
seeks to excuse his beating of Susan by alleging she was 
"bordering on delinquency" (Brief, page 9). There is no 
evidence to support this charge and it ill behooves either 
the defendant or his counsel to place such an accusation 
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against a child in an official record in this state. 
A fair reading of defendant's brief leads irresisti-
bly to the conclusion that defendant admits there was evi-
dence of cruelty, but that defendant contends the Trial 
Court should have believed defendant's testimony rather 
than the evidence offered by plaintiff and on her behalf. 
Defendant apparently asks that the Supreme Court sub-
stitute its judgment for the judgment of the Trial Court, 
but no reason is assigned why this Court ought to depart 
from the long-established principle that the Court: "will 
not upset findings of the Trial Court on issues in which 
the testimony was in conflict, unless the record shows 
that such findings are clearly against the weight of the 
evidence.'' Schuster v. Schuster, 88 Utah 257, 53 P. (2d) 
428; Alldredge v. Alldredge, 229 P. (2d) 681. 
This Court has consistently followed this policy be-
cause, as stated in the Alldredge case: 
''The Trial Court has a better opportunity 
to judge the credibility of the witnesses and weight 
of their testimony. Especially is this true in cases 
involving quarrels between spouses.'' 
In a case decided in 1952, the appellant claimed that 
the Supreme Court should examine the record and should 
reverse the decree of the Trial Court and instead grant 
him a divorce. He also contended that the property di-
vision by the Trial Court was not supported by the evi-
dence. In rejecting appellant's contention, this Court 
said: 
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''This court is reluctant to rnodify a divorce 
decree because usually the evidence is contradic-
tory and the Trial Court having seen and heard 
the witnesses, is more able to determine their 
credibility than we are. Also, in the absence of an 
abuse of discretion we do not disturb the property 
division." Lawlor v. Lawlor, 240 P. (2d) 271. 
It is perfectly clear from the record in this case that 
the Trial Court was convinced that the evidence proved 
cruelty causing great mental distress to a degree suffi-
cient to constitute grounds for a divorce under Utah Law. 
An examination of the comments of the Trial Court after 
both sides had rested, reveals at least five separate state-
ments to this effe-ct. (R. 99, 101, 102, 103, 111). 
The Trial Court was unusually careful in his deter-
mination of the facts in this case and in his disposition 
of the marriage property. Defendant claims in his brief 
that he salvaged nothing from the marriage. It is per-
haps appropriate to point out that the defendant by his 
conduct is not entitled to salvage anything from this 
marriage, which his conduct wrecked. Title 30-3-9, UGA, 
1953, provides : 
"When a divorce is decreed the guilty party 
forfeits all rights acquired by marriage.'' 
The Trial Court, despite this statute, did not de-
prive defendant of his equity in the family residence, even 
though counsel for appellant would have us believe that 
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the disposition of the residence property by the Trial 
Court constitutes an "illusory" award to the defend-
ant. 
Counsel claims that the award is ''illusory~' because 
if the house is sold plaintiff would be entitled to recover 
from the proceeds the amounts she pays for mortgage 
payments, interest and taxes from the date of the divorce 
to the date of sale. A n1oment's reflection will show 
that with each such payment the equity of the parties 
increases and assuming that the present value of the 
house is not changed by inflation or deflation, defendant 
is still entitled to his portion of his present equity and 
plaintiff, if the house should be sold, will merely be reim-
bursed for what she has paid. Defendant seems to as-
sume that such reimbursement will come from his share 
of the equity, but once again the facts do not bear out this 
contention. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN 
REJECTING DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS AND PROFFERS 
OF PROOF AND, IN ANY EVENT, DEFENDANT HAS 
FAILED TO SHOW HE WAS PREJUDICED BY THE 
COURT'S RULINGS. 
Defendant complains because the Trial Court reject-
ed Exhibits 1, 2, 3 and 8 through 15. All of these Exhibits, 
except Exhibit 15, were letters which passed from plain-
tiff to defendant in the summer of 1948, several months 
before the parties were Inarried. The letters indicate 
that plaintiff professed love for the defendant and in 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
fact, her letters to him and the letters he presumably 
wrote her constituted the ·only courtship that these 
parties experienced before the marriage. 
However, the letters in no way tend to disprove 
plaintiff's contention that her superior in the mission 
field exerted pressure upon her to get married in the 
Hawaiian Islands. Plaintiff admitted that she loved the 
defendant before the marriage and the rejected exhibits 
merely tend to confirm that fact, but it seems abundantly 
clear that plaintiff might not have wanted to get married 
at that time and in that place, particularly in the absence 
of her family. Thus it is seen that the letters do not sup-
port defendant's contention. 
Even if the Exhibits did tend to disprove plaintiff's 
testimony, defendant has cited no authority to show, nor 
has any argument been made, that the Exhibits were 
material to the issues in the case by way of defense or 
explanation for defendant's conduct. 
Defendant likewise complains that the court commit-
ted error in refusing to allow him to obtain certain wit-
nesses to testify in accordance with the offer of proof 
outlined by counsel for the defendant (R. 93, 94). No 
attempt was made in the lower Court and none has been 
made here to show what, if any, effect such testimony 
could have had upon the issues in this case. There is 
no showing that any of the evidence was material or 
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would have constituted a defense sufficient to inure to 
defendant's benefit. 
It is a familiar doctrine that the conduct of the trial 
by the Trial Court is a matter largely within the discre-
tion of that Court, and unless it is shown upon appeal 
that the Court abused its discretion to the prejudice of the 
appellant, the rulings of the Trial Court will ordinarily 
not be disturbed. 
It is submitted by the plaintiff that neither the record 
nor defendant's brief on appeal reveal an abuse of dis-
cretion, and even if an abuse of discretion could be in-
ferred from the record, there has been no showing that 
prejudice resulted to the defendant. The Trial Court 
evidently assumed much of what defendant desired to 
prove, because he commented on several occasions to the 
effect that plaintiff was overly sensitive and in fact im-
plied that he thought she was neurotic (R. 102). 
CONCLUSION 
This case was tried in the District Court, March 8, 
1955. Prior to that time there had been three separate 
hearings, concerning the conduct of the defendant or the 
disposition of the property or the children (R. 109). Fol-
lowing trial in March, defendant objected to the proposed 
Findings of Fact and the parties again appeared before 
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the Trial Court. At that time, after full arguinent, the 
Trial Court made changes in the proposed Findings. 
Therefore, the Findings of Fact and Decree represent the 
considered and deliberate judgment of the Court. 
Under these circums,tances, and in view of the entire 
record, we submit the decision of the lower Court is cor-
rect and ought to be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SKEEN,THURMAN,WORSLEY 
& SNOW 
.Attorneys for Plantiff and 
Respondent 
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